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At modern-day intersections, traffic lights and stop signs assist human drivers to
cross the intersection safely. Traffic congestion in urban road networks is a costly
problem that affects all major cities. Efficiently operating intersections is largely
dependent on accuracy and precision of human drivers, engendering a lingering
uncertainty of attaining safety and high throughput. To improve the efficiency of the
existing traffic network and mitigate the effects of human error in the intersection, many
studies have proposed autonomous, intelligent transportation systems. These studies
often involve utilizing connected autonomous vehicles, implementing a supervisory
system, or both. Implementing a supervisory system is relatively more popular due to
the security concerns of vehicle-to-vehicle communication. Even though supervisory
systems are a step in the right direction for security, many supervisory systems’ safe
operation solely relies on the promise of connected data being correct, making system
reliability difficult to achieve. To increase fault-tolerance and decrease the effects
of position uncertainty, this thesis proposes the Reliable and Robust Intersection
Manager, a supervisory system that uses a separate surveillance system to dependably
detect vehicles present in the intersection in order to create data redundancy for more
accurate scheduling of connected autonomous vehicles. Adding the Surveillance System
ensures that the temporal safety buffers between arrival times of connected autonomous
vehicles are maintained. This guarantees that connected autonomous vehicles can
traverse the intersection safely in the event of large vehicle controller error, a single
rogue car entering the intersection, or a sybil attack. To test the proposed system given
these fault-models, MATLAB® was used to create simulations in order to observe the
functionality of R2IM compared to the state-of-the-art supervisory system, Robust
Intersection Manager. Though R2IM is less efficient than the Robust Intersection
i
Manager, it considers more fault models. The Robust Intersection Manager failed to
maintain safety in the event of large vehicle controller errors and rogue cars, however
R2IM resulted in zero collisions.
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Rising traffic congestion has become inescapable, consuming our time and also
endangering lives on the road. According to the Federal Highway Administration Office
of Safety, the United States alone averaged 8,578 fatal crashes that occurred within
an intersection between 2010 to 2017. Many of these accidents can be attributed to
human error. In an effort to decrease the number of accidents and fatalities on the road,
many autonomous, multi-agent frameworks have been studied that generally fall under
two categories: cooperative traffic management, a vehicle-to-vehicle (many-to-many)
communication, and centralized traffic management, an infrastructure-to-vehicles
(one-to-many) communication between the Intersection Manager (IM)1 and connected
autonomous vehicles (CAVs), respectively. Prominent studies have been done by Li
and Wang 2006, Neuendorf and Bruns 2004, Zohdy, Kamalanathsharma, and Rakha
2012, and Elhenawy et al. 2015 using a cooperative traffic management approach,
however cooperative traffic management approaches are relatively less popular than
centralized approaches due to the security concerns of vehicle-to-vehicle communication
and their requirement for high network bandwidth. Therefore, centralized approaches
have been more in the limelight in the research community. Figure 1 displays a direct
comparison of the different kinds of centralized traffic management protocols. These
centralized approaches include 1) Query-Based IM (QB-IM), 2) Velocity-Assignment
IM (VA-IM), 3) Robust Intersection Management (RIM), and the method this thesis
1Intersection Manager and Intersection Management are interchangeable throughout the thesis,
based on the context in which they read.
1
proposes 4) Reliable and Robust Intersection Management of Connected Autonomous
Vehicles (R2IM).
Figure 1. The centralized traffic management protocols are Velocity-Assignment
Intersection Manager, Query-Based Intersection Manager, RIM, and finally the
proposed Intersection Manager, R2IM.
Cutting-edge examples of QB-IM were implemented by Dresner and Stone 2008
and Jin et al. 2012. In these studies, each CAV sends a computed Velocity of Arrival
(VOA) and Time of Arrival (TOA) to the IM. The IM responds with either a success
or failure message corresponding to whether or not the CAV trajectory is clear for the
requested time interval. If the IM’s response is a success message the car may proceed,
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but if IM’s response is a failure message then the car must slow down and send the
request again. This continues until the CAV receives a success message from the IM
or the vehicle slows to a stop outside the intersection. Due to the high communication
overhead of vehicles constantly communicating with the IM, QB-IM experiences high
network delay which can lead to slower traffic and reduced efficiency. Another concern
is the high computation required by the vehicles to schedule themselves.
Studies performed by Andert, Khayatian, and Shrivastava 2017 and Lee and Park
2012 iterated on QB-IM and developed VA-IM. In VA-IM, a CAV sends its current
position and velocity to the IM and the IM responds with an assigned velocity. The
CAV is then expected to approach and traverse the intersection at that velocity so as to
avoid collisions in the intersection. In order to account for position uncertainty, VA-IM
considers a safety buffer or an invisible barrier2 around each car during scheduling. VA-
IM is more consistent in scheduling down-time between CAVs because it can essentially
specify arrival times instead of waiting for CAV requests as with QB-IM. Additionally
VA-IM has less network traffic overhead because vehicles are not constantly requesting
access to the intersection, aiding VA-IM to be more efficient than QB-IM. However,
VA-IM is also flawed as it does not typically account for network delay, time to actuate
to the target velocity, and delay caused by the IM’s computation. VA-IM typically
assumes that the vehicles can quickly reach their assigned velocity, follow a trajectory
according to that velocity, and that the safety buffer absorbs all position/velocity
inaccuracies. But this safety buffer can still be violated.
To solve many of VA-IM’s issues, Khayatian, Mehrabian, and Shrivastava 2018
created RIM which receives the current velocity, position, and timestamp and assigns
2The length in meters of the safety buffer depends on the dimensions of the vehicle, relative
accuracy of sensors, and maximum specified velocity of the vehicle. The safety buffer must also take
into account the worst-case network delay and worst-case execution time.
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a VOA and TOA instead of a fixed velocity. RIM solves the issue of safety buffer
violations generally associated with VA-IM by providing CAVs with more flexibility
in their trajectory; the IM calculates an optimal, feasible position trajectory for a
requesting CAV and the CAV actuates with any feasible acceleration needed to achieve
the assigned TOA and VOA. This makes RIM robust to external disturbance and
model mismatches, situations which would cause VA-IM’s safety buffer to be violated
and scheduling3 to fail.
Though RIM solves many security concerns, consider a vehicle which has large
controller error, randomly accelerates or decelerates out-of-control, or is spoofing its
information; this car will inevitably crash when RIM is implemented because the IM
relies on connected vehicle data accuracy and is not equipped with security measures for
these vehicle failure scenarios. To ensure vehicle failure does not result in an accident,
it is necessary for the IM to have access to environmental data. By implementing
an environmental sensing system, connected vehicle data can be verified and safety
buffers can be monitored to ensure there are no erroneous scenarios occurring.
This thesis introduces the Reliable and Robust Intersection Manager, or R2IM,
an intersection management scheme that uses a surveillance system to increase data
redundancy, enabling the IM to make more informed and accurate scheduling decisions
for CAVs. R2IM guarantees safety by utilizing position data from both the detection
system and connected vehicle data to ensure vehicles are detected. Further, it proposes
a new methodology for handling safety buffers temporally by ensuring it is physically
impossible for vehicles to collide in the event that a vehicle has large controller error
or goes rogue.
3Scheduling refers to the space-time schedule that the IM creates to guide CAVs safely and
efficiently through an intersection.
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In order to test the different aspects of the proposed system, MATLAB® was used
to simulate the different CAV failure scenarios. A short study on cyber-attacks was
performed, where the Surveillance System is used to verify position data to avoid
vehicles spoofing data and encryption is used to ensure denial of service attacks were
difficult to achieve. In RIM, this inevitably slows throughput as vehicles which are
not present is scheduled in the intersection however it does not affect the throughput
of R2IM since cyber-attack vehicles will not be considered for scheduling. For testing
the vehicle controller error, the set of acceptable position trajectories was used to
determine whether or not randomly generated vehicles were within acceptable error
bounds. This was coupled with testing tolerance to rogue vehicles since a vehicle with
large vehicle controller error should be considered rogue since it isn’t following the IM’s
instructions. In these tests, vehicles either accelerated or decelerated out-of-control
at random points in time for a random time duration. The simulation showed that
R2IM was able to avoid all collisions in the event of these failures whereas RIM failed
between approximately 3% and 16% of the time.
This thesis will discuss the current state of research in the field of intersection
management of autonomous vehicles, the methodology proposed to create a more
robust solution, the experiments performed to test the R2IM’s correctness and efficiency,





Many existing approaches have been proposed to manage connected autonomous
vehicles through intersections. The first method to be researched is QB-IM. A great
example of a QB-IM research is Autonomous Intersection Manager (AIM) introduced
by Dresner and Stone 2008. Vehicles are scheduled using the First-Come-First-
Served (FCFS) technique where vehicles are served based on the communication
initiation time; those with earlier communication initiation times are served first.
AIM implements QB-IM exactly as previously mentioned, and thus has the same
problems to consider. The first problem is that the IM must process multiple requests
and perform calculations to ensure the suggested VOA and TOA does not interfere
with the schedule already in place, creating high computational load. The second
problem is heavy network traffic; when many requests are received by the IM, it could
cause scheduling delay and slow the overall throughput of the intersection. The third
problem is that the scope of safety assumptions is limited to perfect operation of cars,
meaning it is not fault tolerant for model mismatches4, external disturbances, car
malfunctions, or attacks5.
Another QB-IM study performed by Jin, Wu, Boriboonsomsin, and Barth 2012
4In order for the IM to schedule a vehicle, it must have a pre-existing vehicle model by which it
can determine the vehicle’s motion. For example, a vehicle which is assigned a constant velocity has
a linear motion and so the vehicle model is considered to be two-dimensional. A model mismatch
occurs if the vehicle doesn’t behave according to the assumed vehicle model.
5AIM also has mechanisms to control human-driven vehicles in addition to CAVs, however as the
scope of this thesis is limited to full penetration of autonomous vehicles in the driving space only the
fully autonomous system will be considered.
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is “Advanced intersection management for connected vehicles using a multi-agent
systems approach” which promises to improve vehicle emissions, fuel consumption,
traffic control, and safety of automotive travel. Vehicle agents interact with intersection
management agents inside a time-space, n x n grid. Reservations are made on a FCFS
basis when vehicle agents successfully request from the the IM a VOA and TOA in
which critical grid spaces are not occupied. This research was further extrapolated to
use platooning, as done in the study Jin et al. 2013, to make further improvements.
Platoons have the ability to reserve multiple grid spaces for traversing the intersection
safely. However, Jin, Wu, Boriboonsomsin, and Barth have the same primary problems
associated with AIM; this method is not fault tolerant, has high computational delay,
and high network delay though lessened by implementing platoons.
In comparison to QB-IM, there is VA-IM which diminishes the problems of heavy
network traffic and computational load. A great example of VA-IM is the study
Crossroads by Andert, Khayatian, and Shrivastava 2017, where all vehicles first
synchronize with the IM, then vehicles send a data packet with their current position
and velocity. Finally the IM sends each vehicle an actuation timestamp and a target
velocity to maintain from reception through intersection traversal. In Crossroads,
vehicles have deterministic behavior but accidents can still occur. This is because
CAVs track a constant velocity instead of a trajectory through the intersection. By
tracking a constant velocity, the time it may take a vehicle to accelerate or decelerate
to reach the target velocity must be absorbed by the error within the safety buffer.
If the safety buffer is exceededd, accidents occur. Crossroads also depends on the
assumption of perfect execution, and so is not fault tolerant to model mismatches,
external disturbance, car malfunctions, or attacks.
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RIM iterates on velocity assignment by solving the problems of model mismatches6
and external disturbances7. RIM’s methodology is unique in that it does not provide
a strict trajectory to follow; instead the CAV communicates a data packet containing
information including current velocity and position and the IM will respond with a
feasible TOA and VOA. It is left up to the CAV to calculate an optimal trajectory and
track it over time. Even though RIM accounts for small vehicle controller error, like
other IMs it is prone to large car malfunctions and intentional attacks like cyber-attacks
and rogue vehicles.
All of these related works have made assumptions about vehicle operation, however
there are far more inputs to consider when modeling an intersection than perfect
operation. Vehicle failures, rogue vehicles, and attacks can cause accidents in all the
above scenarios. Methodologies to handle such scenarios need to be considered if such
works are to actually be implemented in the real world. R2IM proposes a new fault
model that does not assume the ideal case of vehicle operation and provides a solution
to managing traffic safely in the event this fault model occurs.
6Model mismatches occur when a vehicle is not behaving as expected.
7External disturbances include elements such as wind and bumps in the road.
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Chapter 3
RELIABLE AND ROBUST INTERSECTION MANAGEMENT
R2IM is resilient to cyber-attack and vehicle controller error by providing an
extra source of data via the detection system, aiding the IM to make more informed
scheduling decisions thus increasing system reliability. R2IM is comprised of seven
independent phases: 1) The detection mechanism is constantly monitoring the inter-
section to detect CAVs that go astray from the protocol and/or avoid communicating
with the Intersection Manager, 2) The CAV synchronizes its clock with the IM’s clock,
3) The detection mechanism checks if the CAV that synchronized its clock is actually
physically present near the intersection to rule out the possibility of a potential
cyber-attack, 4) If it is not present, the IM uses MAC blocking to ensure the vehicle
does not increase network traffic, 5) If the vehicle is present, the car sends a request
to the IM, passing its current velocity and position, 6) The IM responds with a TOA
and VOA, and 7) The car actuates in order to reach the desired positions according
to the VOA and TOA. In Dedinsky et al. 2019, we explained preliminary ideas of
implementing an dependable intersection management system using a surveillance
system.
3.1 Fault Model: Rogue Vehicle
A rogue car is an agent that starts to accelerate at an arbitrary and unknown
acceleration in the range [amin, amax], starting at an arbitrary time t. This may be
a vehicle that breaks down, is a vehicle with malicious intent, is a human-driven
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vehicle, a vehicle which does not communicate with other vehicles and/or the IM,
or a vehicle which does not follow the IM’s instructions to name a few. We define
the behavior of a rogue vehicle by the worst-case acceleration of a rogue vehicle or
the worst-case deceleration of a rogue vehicle. In these cases, a rogue vehicle can
be categorized as either a vehicle that accelerates or decelerates out-of-control and
does not follow the IM’s assigned trajectory or a vehicle whose vehicle controller error
is large. The position trajectory of a vehicle which functions as expected has an
associated acceptable error (✏) from the optimal trajectory. If a vehicle is within ±✏
distance from the optimal trajectory, then the vehicle is not marked rogue.
Consider the scenario where a vehicle is not following the calculated optimal
trajectory. There may be two causes for this: 1) there is a large external disturbance
and the vehicle does not actuate as expected or 2) there are delays in determining
whether or not a position trajectory taken by the vehicle is valid (i.e. computation,
communication, detection). If the position does not belong to the set of acceptable
position trajectories, it will be considered rogue. The acceptable trajectories were
experimentally determined where a chi-squared ( 2) distribution was created with
a maximum amplitude relating to the worst-case position error. The worst-case
position error was found to be 15m by exhaustively testing VOAs with varying entry
velocities. 15m error can only occur at the point where the vehicle transitions from
actuating with the initial velocity to the VOA. This is because the expected position
is calculated based on the instantaneous change in velocity, however since this is
physically impossible the vehicle is allowed a large error to accelerate in order to
recover to reach certain positions at specific times. Note the relationship in Equation
Set 3.1 that calculates the  2 distribution used, where the distribution set the value
of variable x to the considered time interval for the vehicle to cross the intersection,
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k equals the point in time immediately after the time when the vehicle crosses the
actuation line, and each element of the computed  2 probability distribution function
(PDF) is multiplied by the maximum error "=15m. Figure 2 shows the generated  2
PDF once it is multiplied with "=15m.
" = worst  case position error




Z2i  sum of squares
Q ⇠  2k  sum distributed according to  2
µ = k  degrees of freedom





PDFi = PDFi · "
(3.1)
Once the  2 distribution is created and its maximum amplitude is related to the "m
at time k, it is added and subtracted from the calculated optimal position trajectory
to obtain the acceptable bounds for a normally operating vehicle as seen in Equation
3.2.
trajectoryoptimal = expected position trajectory
trajectoryoptimal   PDF  trajectoryoptimal  trajectoryoptimal + PDF
(3.2)
The chi-squared distribution tapers off at the settling point, which defines the time
at which vehicles must follow the position trajectory with 5% error. The settling time
was also determined experimentally as the point in the majority of vehicle position
11
Figure 2. The resulting  2 PDF after multiplication with "=15m will result in a
distribution similar to this. Note the maximum amplitude occurs around the time
when the target velocity changes from the initial velocity to the VOA.
trajectories where the error from the optimal path is less than or equal to 5%. The
position error is a result of the Proportional-Integral-Derivative (PID)8 controller
behavior and system delay, since anything outside these error sources may result in
dangerous vehicle behavior and the vehicle should therefore be marked rogue.
An example of acceptable position trajectories is shown in Figure 3, where there is
some arrival velocity applied until the vehicle reaches the actuation line at -200m9.
Once the actuation line is reached the vehicle should continue traveling with the
assigned VOA toward the intersection. The expected position is calculated based
on the expected velocity at a given timestamp. Since the expected velocity changes
instantaneously from the arrival velocity to the VOA once the actuation line is crossed,
8This PID controller is a control feedback loop that modulates vehicle’s speed in order to mitigate
the position error. The position error is calculated based on the vehicle’s actual position versus the
vehicle’s expected position at certain timestamps.
9The position of the actuation is negative because the vehicle’s movement started from a negative
position and moved toward the intersection which was at position 0m.
12
Figure 3. The expected position of the car is based on the VOA, initial velocity, and
distance traversed over time. The acceptable bounds for error is a probability
distribution with a maximum at the point in time where the position is likely furthest
from the expected position. This probability distribution is added and subtracted
from the expected position to obtain the lower and upper bounds of acceptable
position trajectories.
the expected position around the time of the velocity change is very difficult to
physically attain. The vehicle must accelerate and decelerate to reach the expected
position at a given timestamp. Eventually the vehicle will catch up to its position
trajectory and the vehicle’s acceleration will approach zero, the actual velocity of
the vehicle will be approximately the same as the expected VOA, and the expected
positions will be reached at the correct timestamps.
The last fault model considered is a cyber-attack. One form of cyber-attack is a
sybil attack. According to Bentjen 2018 a sybil attacker uses false data to authenticate
with a system in order to cause harm. In this case, the cyber-attacker’s malicious
intents are directed toward the IM in order to cause jamming or spoof the position of
a vehicle which is not actually at that location. R2IM uses the surveillance system
to check whether or not a requesting vehicle exists. If the vehicle does exist, normal
operation ensues, however if the vehicle does not exist, the IM sends an emergency
13
packet to all vehicles to proceed with caution and uses MAC blocking to prevent a
malicious attacker from sending packets and slowing down network throughput.
3.2 Practical Assumptions
1. A Surveillance System should have the ability to detect anomalies that may
occur inside or outside the intersection. Some of these anomalies may include
communication failure, cyber-attack, rogue vehicles, and road cautions such as
pedestrians, bicyclists, garbage, etc. The scope of this study assumes operation
will not be interrupted by road cautions interfering with vehicle trajectories.
2. The IM cannot control rogue vehicles targeting CAVs maliciously. To avoid such
collisions, it is assumed that all vehicles are well equipped with Adaptive Cruise
Control (ACC). R2IM was designed to be robust against only one rogue vehicle
at a time in the intersection.
3. In R2IM, vehicles turning inside the intersection follow the same methodology as
RIM, where vehicles are not limited to slower speeds approaching the intersection
and slow down only while they turn. This keeps throughput high compared to
typical VA-IM strategies.
3.3 Vehicles
The vehicle interacts with the IM by first synchronizing10 its clock with IM’s clock.
The vehicle decelerates to a stop if the vehicle does not synchronize with the IM on
10Synchronization is the process of aligning the clocks of the vehicle with clock of the IM. This
makes the trajectory calculated by the vehicle the same as the trajectory calculated by the IM for
that vehicle
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time. Once synchronized, the vehicle transmits its position and velocity to the IM
and waits for a timeout period to receive a VOA and TOA. If the VOA and TOA
were not received within the timeout, the vehicle decelerates to a stop until it receives
these values. If the vehicle receives the VOA and TOA within timeout, it calculates a
reference trajectory and follows it using a typical PID controller calculated based on
position error. The reference trajectory is followed after the actuation line is crossed.
The actuation line’s position is shown in Equation 3.3, where the position of the
actuation line (Poseactuation) is the position of the transmit line (Posetransmit) plus
the distance traveled if the car is moving with vmax over the time duration related to
the the worst-case round-trip communication delay between the IM and a CAV. In
this equation,  tWCRTD refers to the time duration of the worst-case round-trip delay.
Poseactuation = Posetransmit + tWCRTD · vmax (3.3)
If a vehicle receives an emergency signal from the IM, the vehicle comes to a complete
stop and waits for the IM to recalculate its VOA and TOA. Algorithm 1 in Appendix
A displays the pseudocode for the vehicle controller. The reference trajectory, Ref-
erence_Traj, is calculated based on Equation 3.4, where V OA ·  t is the distance
travelled given a time duration  t and a vehicle traveling with velocity V OA.
Dtrajectory = V OA · t (3.4)
Refer to Figure 4 for a visualization of the vehicle controller algorithm. The steps
of the flow chart are followed until the vehicle crosses the intersection, at which point
it continues through the intersection with the assigned velocity.
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Figure 4. A flow chart describing the methodology behind a vehicle’s behavior in
R2IM.
3.4 Intersection Manager
In order to calculate a vehicle’s VOA and TOA, R2IM depends on both the
connected vehicle data and the detection system data. Algorithm 2 in Appendix B
shows the pseudocode for the IM. The IM maintains its own data structure called
IM_Data that stores each vehicle’s data. Further, IM_Data provides a space-time
schedule of previously calculated vehicle VOAs and TOAs. The IM uses IM_Data to
ensure no two vehicles have conflicting schedules. V_Data is the vehicle data packet
comprised of identification (ID), position, velocity and timestamp. Detect_Data is the
detection data packet which is comprised of the ID, position, velocity, and timestamp
of each vehicle. V_Data and Detect_Data mesh11 together in a ratio related to the
accuracy of the detection data in order to create IM_Data, as shown in Equation Set
3.5.
11Meshing combines two data sources. This allows the position of the vehicle as perceived by the
IM to be in terms of the data received from both the surveillance system and the vehicle itself.
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↵ = detection probability
IM_Data(V_ID).position = V_Data(1  ↵) +Detect_Data(↵)
(3.5)
The control loop in Algorithm 2 starts by checking RequestQueue, which is a
queue that holds vehicles that have not been added to the scheduling policy. If the
queue is not empty, a vehicle is dequeued and the vehicle’s status and position is
checked using Check-Vehicle-Behavior(). In this function, if a vehicle tries to interact
with the IM and the vehicle is not detected, IM_Data deletes all record of the vehicle
and the vehicle’s MAC address is blocked. However if the vehicle is present, the
aforementioned meshing technique is used to create a new entry in IM_Data. Once
the vehicle’s status has been verified, a VOA and TOA for the vehicle is assigned by
calling the function Trajectory-Assignment() which schedules the vehicle in IM_Data
using a FCFS approach. Once the trajectory is calculated, the VOA and TOA are
sent to the vehicle.
Algorithm 2 uses a timer interrupt which is necessary to update IM_Data. The
interrupt updates Detect_Data with the newest data received from the Detection
System and calls Check-Detected(). As the name suggests, Check-Detected() checks
all the vehicles’ (V_IDs’) detected data from the Detection System for anomalies
like a car accelerating or decelerating out-of-control. Based on this detected data
and the associated accuracy of detection, IM_Data is updated. In the first part of
Check-Detected(), a car is marked rogue if its position violates the reference trajectory
by more than the allotted ✏ error. When a vehicle is marked rogue, the IM immediately
calls Broadcast-Alert() function to broadcast an emergency stop packet to all the
vehicles approaching the intersection. In Broadcast-Alert() after the rogue vehicle is
safely outside the intersection, the IM reassigns all VOAs and TOAs of cars waiting
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to access the intersection and normal operation ensues. In the second part of Check-
Detected(), if a vehicle is recognized with high detection accuracy and the IM has not
scheduled it in IM_Data, the vehicle is added to IM_Data, is marked rogue, and the
function Broadcast-Alert() is called. Lastly in the third part of Check-Detected(), if the
Detection System recognizes a vehicle has exited the intersection, function Trajectory-
Reassignment() is called. Trajectory-Reassignment() reschedules the following two
vehicles (V_ID+1 and V_ID+2) after the vehicle which has just exited (V_ID)
earlier TOAs and faster VOAs. This results in two reassignments per vehicle. The
reassignment works by scheduling V_ID+1 with the earliest feasible TOA given
velocity constraints (i.e., if the vehicle following the exited vehicle is 100m from
the intersection, the earliest TOA is the time to accelerate and the time to cross
the remaining 100m traveling with velocity vmax) and V_ID+2 is also rescheduled
to arrive after V_ID+1 using the calculated temporal safety buffer which will be
discussed in detail later in Chapter 3.6.
Figure 5. A flow chart describing the methodology behind the IM’s behavior in R2IM.
For a visualization on how the IM algorithm works in R2IM, refer to Figure 5.
The IM is always running, thus never reaches a finish state. While there are vehicles
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requesting to enter the intersection, the IM is constantly checking the detected data,
scheduling vehicles, and ensuring anomalous behavior does not result in a crash.
3.5 Surveillance System
The Surveillance System provides R2IM with a layer of redundancy, thereby
increasing reliability. Algorithm 3 shows pseudocode for the Surveillance System.
Vehicles_Present[ ] will keep track of the detected vehicles entering and exiting the
intersection. Vehicles_Present[ ] also has an associated percent accuracy depending
on the belief distribution that the vehicle is actually in a specific location. This belief
distribution is produced based on sensor filtering mechanisms, like Bayesian filtering
as done by Geist, Pietquin, and Fricout 2008.
It is assumed the Detection System is an array of sensors meshed12 together in order
to detect vehicles. There are many solutions available to detecting and locating objects.
Many studies such as Rodriguez Serrano and Larlus 2013, Csurka and Perronnin
2008, and Hu, Larlus, and Csurka 2012 have been done in computer vision research
with localization and identification techniques. Sensors such as LIDAR, ultrasonic,
radar, and magnetometer could aid the cameras by implementing passive tracking
mechanisms for more precise positioning. Figure 6 displays the general flow of the
Surveillance System’s algorithm.
12Meshing sensors’ data means combining the collected sensors’ data in order to create a single
source of data that has eliminated noisy measurements.
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Figure 6. A flow chart describing the methodology behind the Surveillance System.
3.6 Mathematical Proof of Safety
The temporal safety buffer used for scheduling in RIM can be seen in Figure 7.
If a vehicle goes rogue and accelerates or decelerates out-of-control, a collision is
possible. In order to prevent such a collision from happening, there must be enough
time between scheduling of the vehicles so that operational vehicles can come to a
complete stop if needed or proceed through the intersection safely.
Figure 7. In the worst-case, RIM allows scheduling of vehicles directly after each
other, as long as there is no conflict of trajectory.
For the remainder of this proof, projectile motion is mapped to a linear displacement
equation. The equations of motion of a vehicle in two dimensions are as shown in
Equation Set 3.6 where x, y are the position of the vehicle in Cartesian coordinate,
✓ is heading angle, v is velocity, a is acceleration, L is vehicle wheelbase and  is
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the steering angle, and u is the control input for the motor. Kp, Ki and Kd are PID
controller gains, e,
R
e and e˙ are the error between actual position and target position,












Since the expected vehicle motion has linear velocity, the 2-dimensional model is




In the case study portrayed by Figure 8, vehicle 2 accelerates out-of-control towards
the critical area. In order to ensure vehicle 1 makes it safely through the intersection,
it must be physically infeasible for vehicle 1 to collide with vehicle 2. A global standard
for maximum and minimum acceleration and velocity is defined by Equation Set 3.8
in order to give context to the worst-case calculations. These global standards are
based on the worst-case acceleration and deceleration (i.e., if a moving truck is in the
same system as a Ferrari sports car, the global standard for maximum deceleration
will be based on the moving truck’s maximum deceleration since it will have a worse
braking system than the Ferrari sports car will.)
v = [vmin, vmax]
a = [amin, amax]
(3.8)
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The amount of time it will take to stop a vehicle ( tstop)13 will reach a maximum
when the vehicle is moving with maximum velocity. This time to stop a vehicle is
derived in Equation 3.9. Note that the value of amin is negative because a negative
acceleration is applied to decelerate the vehicle.




The distance the vehicle travels in time  tstop in order to come to a complete stop is






















When a vehicle is less than Dstop meters away from the intersection, it may not have
time to stop before the intersection, provided another vehicle, with an intersecting
trajectory, starts accelerating out-of-control. Take the previously discussed example
where 2 vehicles are scheduled, vehicle 1 is schedule first and vehicle 2 is scheduled
second; vehicle 2 goes rogue as soon as vehicle 1, a vehicle with an intersecting
trajectory, is Dstop meters away from the intersection. The objective is to make sure
that vehicle 1 crosses the intersection before vehicle 2 reaches the intersection edge
to avoid accidents. Note that if vehicle 2 goes rogue before vehicle 1 has reached
Dstop meters from the intersection, then vehicle 1 has enough time to stop outside the
13Time duration values are denoted with a   in front of the value, whereas timestamps are not
represented with a   before the value.
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intersection. The time it takes vehicle 1 to cross the braking distance ( tcrossDstop1)











 tcrossCriticalArea1 =  tcrossDstop1 + tcrossIntersection1
(3.12)
In that amount of time, a vehicle which has gone rogue and is travelling with maximum
velocity can travel DRogue meters shown in Equation 3.13.
DRogue = vmax · tcrossCriticalArea1 + vmax · tdelay (3.13)
Note that  tdelay refers to the experimentally determined worst-case detection delay
related to the Surveillance System. In the time between the vehicle going rogue and
the detection of the rogue vehicle, the car could have traveled vmax · tdelay distance.
If vehicle 1 is already inside the critical area when vehicle 2 goes rogue, vehicle
1 must be able to traverse the intersection safely before the vehicle 2 reaches the
intersection edge. This can be guaranteed by ensuring vehicle 2 is at least DRogue
meters away from the intersection at the time vehicle 1 is Dstop meters away from the
intersection.
To ensure vehicle 2 is DRogue meters away from the intersection, the vehicles must
follow specific timing constraints. The IM needs the entry time of vehicle 2 (tentry2, i.e.
the time at which vehicle 2 crosses the transmit line) and needs to calculate the time
at which vehicle 1 is expected to Dstop meters away from intersection(tarriveDstop1).
Their difference is the amount of time,  tcrossDtravelled , vehicle 2 has to cover Dtravelled
meters. road length is considered to be the distance between the actuation line
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and the intersection edge. Based on these constraints, vehicle 2’s VOA and TOA is
calculated as shown in Equation Set 3.14.
Dtravelled = (road length)  (DRogue)
tarriveDstop1 = TOA1   tcrossDstop1













Figure 8. The relative position of the distances used in R2IM.
In the case where vehicle 1 is decelerating out-of-control toward the intersection,
vehicle 2 definitely has enough time to come to a complete stop outside the intersection
and wait until the rogue vehicle 1 is safely outside the intersection. Once the rogue
vehicle 1 is outside the intersection, vehicle 2 receives a new TOA and VOA from the




R2IM provides a layer of data redundancy, making it resilient to vehicle controller
error, rogue cars, and cyber-attack. Two experiments were conducted to ensure
correctness: the first experiment was to guarantee no crashes occur in R2IM in the
presence of a rogue vehicle and the second experiment conducted was a throughput
test. Throughput is calculated in two ways: 1) the inverse of average wait time of all
the vehicles and 2) as the outgoing flow rate of vehicles. The flow rate is the number
of cars that occur per lane per second. Finally a thorough study was conducted
investigating cyber-attacks, which are intended to stop the intersection from working
correctly by spoofing vehicle data to cause inaccuracies in the IM’s scheduling policy.
R2IM detects these failures correctly and implements recovery scenarios to ensure
accidents don’t occur.
4.1 Rogue Car
Since the IM cannot determine the final destination of a rogue car, all vehicles
must come to a complete stop and wait for the rogue car to complete its trajectory.
The rogue vehicle’s position is tracked using Detect_Data. Once the rogue car has
exited the intersection, traffic flow resumes after reassigning each vehicle’s VOA and
TOA.
To test the efficacy of R2IM, MATLAB® was used to build a 2-dimensional simu-
lator. The simulator incorporates the vehicle’s PID controller, the IM’s instructions,
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random delay, random failures, random velocities, and random entry times. The
simulator begins operation when the vehicle sends a request to the IM for the VOA
and TOA, with the precondition that the vehicle and IM have synchronized. The
vehicle receives the VOA and TOA from the IM and waits until the actuation line is
crossed to actuate toward the expected trajectory. The distance between the transmit
line and the actuation line is 10m since the maximum velocity considered was 20m/s
and the minimum velocity considered was 0m/s. Consider the scenario where a
vehicle is traveling 20m/s; it would take this vehicle 1s to travel 10m. According to
Dedicated Short-Range CommunicationCommission Standards backed by the Federal
Communication Commission and research completed by Savic, Schiller, and Papatri-
antafilou 2017, the worst-case round trip delay between vehicles and infrastructure is
approximately 0.4s. This means the worst-case round-trip delay for communication
between the IM and the CAVs is less than the time it takes the vehicle to traverse
10m even if the vehicle is traveling vmaxm/s.
Two IMs were simulated: RIM and R2IM. R2IM’s implementation differed from
RIM in that it implemented an omnipotent detection system which was tolerant to
failure scenarios such as rogue cars and large controller error. Once these situations
were detected by the Surveillance System, the Reliable and Robust IM initiated
resilience mechanisms. For the implemented resilience mechanism, the Surveillance
System alerted the IM of erroneous vehicle behavior and the IM sent an emergency stop
packet to all the incoming vehicles. Then recovery was implemented by reassigning
the TOAs and VOAs of all stopped vehicles and normal operation ensued.
To maximize efficiency of the simulations, a study was done to determine the
optimal values for the length of the road leading to the intersection and the number of
assignments of [VOA,TOA] each vehicle received in normal operation. The average wait
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Figure 9. By varying different road lengths and number of assignments of
[VOA,TOA], different average wait times are obtained. The color scheme shows the
contours of the graph.
time was calculated to determine which combination was optimal as shown in Figure
9. Since three assignments was optimal in almost every case, one initial assignment
and two reassignments were chosen. The road’s length was chosen to be 200m since it
had better average wait times than many other road lengths considered. Additionally,
according to national averages posted by the Federal Transit Administration the
distances between stops is at least 500m in most metropolitan cities. Since two
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intersections back-to-back will result in over 400m between potential stops when the
road length leading to the intersection is 200m and the distance between the transmit
and actuation line is 10m, 200m for the road length is the best option for coverage of
most metropolitan cities.
According to “Reference”, the average vehicle’s length and width is about 5m x
2m so the simulated vehicles were 5m long and 2m wide. The simulated roads had
a 12m road width, leaving the intersection to be of size 12m x 12m, as is standard
according to the Transportation Engineering Agency. The maximum and minimum
accelerations considered were 5m/s2 and -8m/s2 respectively. For testing if vehicles
malfunctions would result in a collision, only two cars are simulated based on the
following assumptions claimed by the following Proof by Induction. For testing
throughput, 50 cars were simulated with varying flow rates(number of cars per second
per lane).
Proof By Induction: Defense for Two Car Simulation
Only two safety critical interactions exist, where the first is when vehicle 2 starts
accelerating out-of-control toward the intersection and the second is when vehicle
1 is decelerating out-of-control when moving towards or within the intersection. If
another vehicle were added to the two-car proposed safety model, there are still only
the two possible safety critical interactions that may happen - that is either a vehicle
is traveling too fast or too slow. Therefore, in a multi-car intersection only the two
safety critical scenarios are feasible. Since two cars can be used to model both these
interactions, a multi-car simulation is not needed.
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4.2 Cyber-Attack
R2IM uses the Surveillance System to check whether or not a requesting vehicle
exists, as shown in Figure 10. The vehicle’s request is either accepted or rejected
based on whether or not the vehicle is detected. In the case a cyber-attacker is trying
to jam the communication network, Quigley and Peddoju, n.d. proposes a solution to
ensuring jamming attacks like Denial of Service(DoS) attacks do not occur. Further,
R2IM assumes a high level of encryption exists between vehicles and the IM making
cyber-attacks difficult.
Figure 10. A cyber-attacker will spoof a car’s position in order to cause an accident
in the intersection. The Surveillance System can communicate to the IM whether or





Safety experiments were conducted for both RIM and R2IM. The resulting statistics
can be seen in Table 1. The table breaks down the failure scenarios tested for safety
into two categories: a rogue car that accelerates out-of-control and a rogue car that
decelerates out-of-control. Unlike RIM, if a vehicle breaks down inside or outside the
intersection the proposed system detects it through infrastructure sensing and takes
preventative measures against collision. RIM on the other hand relies on other CAVs
ACC to detect stalled, broken-down vehicles using ACC. However, ACC often will
not allow enough time for the vehicle to come to a complete stop before its trajectory
intersects with another vehicle.
Table 1. This table illustrates the statistics of the number of crashes, comparing RIM
to R2IM over 1000000 iterations.
IM Failure Scenario Crashes
RIM Decelerating Rogue Car 159336Accelerating Rogue Car 38331
R2IM Deceleration Rogue Car 0Acceleration Rogue Car 0
Two vehicles were simulated, where one of the two vehicles goes rogue. To test
the deceleration case, the first car, i.e., the car scheduled to cross the intersection
first, goes rogue and randomly decelerates out-of-control. To test the acceleration
case, the second car goes rogue and randomly accelerates out-of-control toward the
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intersection. The number of times these cases resulted in an intersection of the cars
created the tally of number of crashes, as can be seen in Table 1. The input values to
the simulation include:
• The initial velocity of the first car randomized between [5,vmax]m/s.
• The initial value of the second car randomized between [5,vmax]m/s.
• The assigned VOA of the first car randomized between [5,vmax   2].
• The tentry2 of the second car is randomized between [0,TOA1]s14.
• The failure time of the vehicle.
The initial velocity values start at 5m/s because many states like Washington,
California, and Pennsylvania in the United States have a minimum speed limit.
Washington State Legislature notes, “No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a
slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic”. The upper
limit of the range of initial velocity values is the global maximum velocity of the system,
meaning the maximum velocity of the car which has the lowest maximum velocity
value. The VOA of the first car is randomized between 5m/s and vmax  2m/s to keep
traffic flow efficient and to allow for position optimization. Position optimization is
made possible by having a lower value for the upper bound on VOA than vmax; if a
constant velocity is too large, the positions which can be obtained become infeasible
to reach because the calculation for the optimal position trajectory does not account
for time to accelerate. The bounds for tentry2 were chosen based on the times when the
cars could feasibly cause a collision and times when it was infeasible. The failure time
is the time at which a vehicle goes out-of-control; since a vehicle may go out-of-control
at any time, the failure time of the vehicle has been randomized between a window
14All timing ranges listed are relative to 0s being the start time of the simulation, i.e. 5s means 5
seconds from the start of the simulation.
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of values at which it is feasible for the vehicle to go out-of-control and affect other
vehicles. The failure time range for both the acceleration and deceleration cases was
randomized between [0,TOA1]s. With these randomized input values, the simulation
was run 1,000,000 times, where each time these input values were randomized. Further
setup of the simulation parameters is described in Section 4.1. During 1,000,000
iterations of the simulation, RIM observed crashes and R2IM maintained safety.
5.1.1 Case Study: Rogue Car Accelerates
This case study observes two vehicles, with intersecting paths inside the intersection,
where the first vehicle (Car 1) is scheduled before the second vehicle (Car 2). Figure 11
shows the case where vehicle 2 is accelerating out-of-control towards the intersection.
Since car 2 fails and is detected rogue before car 1 enters the critical area, car 1
comes to a complete stop. At approximately time 8s, car 2 accelerates out-of-control
toward the intersection. The detection system recognizes car 2 has violated the set of
acceptable position trajectories and at approximately 9s car 1 receives the emergency
stop signal from the IM and begins to decelerate to a stop. Car 1 will remain stopped
until car 2 reaches the end of the intersection, at which time it is safe for car 1 to
traverse the intersection. Note that car 1 stays at approximately Dstopm from the
intersection, where Dstopm equals 25m from the intersection15 while the rogue car 2
completes its trajectory. Note that the vehicle controller is related to position and
not velocity, so to correct for error in position the vehicle may accelerate or decelerate
15The value of the positions are negative because the simulated scenario had initial position -200m
from the intersection and moved toward the intersection which was at position 0m.
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Figure 11. A vehicle is considered to be following the IM’s instructions if it does not
violate the acceptable set of trajectories. This case shows a car accelerating
out-of-control. Car 1 is scheduled first and Car 2, the rogue car, is scheduled second.
Car 1 responds to Rogue Car 2 by decelerating to a stop.
to achieve a certain position at a specific timestamp, resulting in velocity trajectories
as seen in subplots 2 and 4 of the figure.
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5.1.2 Case Study: Rogue Car Decelerate
This case study follows the same basic setup as in Chapter 5.1.1, where Car 1
is scheduled to enter the intersection before Car 2 and they have intersecting paths.
Figure 12 depicts the scenario where Car 1 decelerates out-of-control and Car 2
must react by stopping. The first two sub-figures show Car 1’s position and velocity.
At approximately 17s, the first car decelerates out-of-control and maintains a 5m/s
velocity, which is significantly less than the assigned VOA. In response, the Surveillance
System recognizes Car 1 has gone rogue and alerts the IM; the IM then sends the
emergency stop signal and Car 2 responds by decelerating to a stop at approximately
19s. This ensures Car 2 is safely outside the intersection while Car 1 crosses the
intersection. Once Car 1 has crossed the intersection, Car 2 is reassigned to proceed
through the intersection as quickly as possible at about 28s.
5.2 Performance
RIM’s scheduling policy is different from R2IM because the temporal safety buffer
for R2IM is far more conservative than RIM, as depicted in Figures 8 and 7 respectively.
In order to analyze the performance of R2IM compared to RIM, a MATLAB®
simulation was used to compute the average wait time of both algorithms compared
to a typical traffic light. The average wait time was calculated starting from the
time the vehicle was requesting to traverse the intersection to the time the vehicle
crossed the intersection. The simulation involved a four-way intersection with one
lane of traffic per direction and used 50 cars. The input flow rate varied from 0.1
to 2 cars/lane/second. The simulation was run with the randomized initial values
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Figure 12. A vehicle is considered to be following the IM’s instructions if it does not
violate the acceptable set of trajectories. The case shows a car decelerating
out-of-control. Car 1 is the rogue car which is scheduled first and Car 2 is scheduled
second. Car 2 responds to Rogue Car 1 by stopping. Once Rogue Car 1 has finished
its trajectory through the intersection, Car 2 is reassigned a VOA and TOA and
continues toward the intersection.
as previously described. These inputs were randomized every time the simulation
was run. The results can be viewed as shown in Figure 13. R2IM does indeed have
worse average wait times compared to RIM, however it does not compromise on safety
precautions.
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Figure 13. A one-lane, four-way intersection was simulated for RIM and R2IM. As
flow rate increases, the average wait the vehicles slowly increases.
Another way to look at throughput is the incoming flow rate versus the outgoing
flow rate, as in Figure 14. RIM consistently has higher outgoing flow rate than R2IM.
Further, RIM’s flow rate trend is essentially x = y, or incoming flow rate is equal to
outgoing flow rate until it plateaus at approximately 0.2 cars/lane/second, however
R2IM plateaus at about 0.05 cars/lane/second.
Further analysis on factors affecting throughput of R2IM shows that  tsafety varies
depending on V OA1 and tentry2. Assume two vehicles are simulated, where the first car
scheduled is vehicle 1 and the second car scheduled is vehicle 2. The smaller  tsafety
is, the less the average wait time is for vehicle 2 and the higher the system throughput.
Another simulation was created, where vehicle 1 is scheduled before vehicle 2. As
V OA1 and tentry2 increase,  tsafety decreases. This simulation was tested multiple
times with velocity increasing in steps of 0.1m/s from [5,20]m/s for V OA1 and for
tentry2 from [0,30]s with a step of 0.1s. The resulting  tsafety from each combination
of V OA1 and tentry2 can be seen in Figure 15. As V OA1 increases, vehicle 1 will reach
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Figure 14. A one-lane, four-way intersection was simulated for RIM and R2IM. As
incoming flow rate increases, the outgoing flow rate decreases. Note that in every
instance, RIM has higher outgoing flow than R2IM.
the intersection edge in less time and so the downtime between scheduling vehicles can
be less. Additionally, the later the second vehicle’s tentry2, the less wait time vehicle 2
has before entering the intersection.
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Figure 15. As V OA1 and tentry2 increase, tsafety decreases and the wait time of vehicle




This thesis investigated a way to implement an intersection of autonomous vehicles
which guarantees safety of controllable CAVs. This technique is both time and space
aware, implementing a new centralized way to manage traffic by integrating vehicle
data packets with environmental sensing data to increase data redundancy. The
environmental sensing data obtained via the proposed Surveillance System ensures
that each vehicle remains within reasonable bounds of the optimal trajectory. If
the position of a vehicle violates the set of acceptable trajectories, the Surveillance
System alerts the IM to take further actions to avoid a collision. Furthermore, R2IM
is robust to attack since the Detection System can determine the true location of
a vehicle and implement blocking techniques in the event that a vehicle is spoofing
its position or jamming the network. In order to prove reliability, R2IM was tested
using a MATLAB® simulation against the most robust model for CAV intersection
management, RIM, and for each failure of RIM, R2IM succeeded in avoiding collisions.
Though conservative, in the event a single rogue car or a cyber-attack, R2IM can
guarantee safety.
6.1 Future Work
The fault model of the single rogue vehicle considered by R2IM is small compared
to the scope of possible errors that can occur within an intersection. This algorithm
could be expanded to ensure safety of CAVs when there are multiple rogue agents
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interacting with the intersection. The way R2IM would handle multiple rogue cars is
the same as handling one rogue car, where all controlled vehicles would come to a
complete stop and wait until the rogue vehicles have exited and it is safe to proceed.
However if one rogue vehicle follows after another rogue vehicle, then all throughput
through the intersection will halt until there are no rogue vehicles present, which is
extremely harmful to graceful degradation. Another prospective area for extending
R2IM is to multiple lanes per direction. R2IM was only tested in a four-directional,
one-lane intersection. If each direction increased to two lanes, the total number of
lanes in the intersection would then be eight. R2IM’s protocol only allows one of these
eight lanes to access the intersection at one time, since R2IM considers the rogue
scenario of vehicles being able to collide with one another by swerving into different
lanes inside the intersection. In addition to this, road cautions need to be considered
in order to implement this system robustly in real-time. These road cautions include
pedestrians, bicyclists, construction, etc. Lastly, a recovery mechanism should be
considered if the IM is under a denial-of-service attack, in order to let controllable
vehicles know an erroneous situation has occurred and to come to an emergency stop.
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Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for Vehicle Controller
1 Signal_ISR (VOA,TOA) {
2 Receive new [VOA, TOA] from IM
3 Jump to line 29
4 }
5 Timer_ISR (every t seconds) {
6 if (emergency_variable is true)
7 Stop_car()
8 Jump to line 21
9 end
10 }
11 while(vehicle doesn’t exit intersection)
12 if (sync line crossed and not Synchronized)
13 Synchronize()
14 if (Not Synchronized within timeout)
15 Apply amin
16 Jump to line 13
17 end
18 Set sync_State to true
19 end
20 if (transmit line crossed and sync_State is true)
21 V_Data  Calc-V_Data()
22 Send V_Data to IM
23 Wait for response from IM
24 if (response timed out)
25 Apply amin
26 Jump to line 21
27 else
28 Receive [VOA, TOA] from IM
29 Ref_Traj  Create-Ref-Traj (VOA,TOA)
30 if (actuation line crossed)
31 Actuate using [VOA, TOA]








Algorithm 2: Pseudocode for Intersection Manager
1 global Detect_Data, IM_Data, V_Data
2 Timer_ISR (every t seconds) {
3 Detect_Data  data from Detection System
4 }
5 Trajectory-Reassignment () { . Reassign TOA and VOA of next scheduled
vehicle
6 IM_Data(V_ID+1).TOA  current time + time to cross remaining
distance
7 IM_Data(V_ID+1).VOA  remaining distanceTOA current time
8 Send [VOA,TOA] to V_ID+1




13 Broadcast an alert to other automated vehicles
14 Wait for Rogue Car to go through intersection
15 Schedule() all vehicles again
16 IM_Data[V_ID]  Detect_Data[V_ID]
17 }
18 Check-Detected () {
19 Process Detect_Data;
20 while (V_ID in Detect_Data not addressed and detection accuracy is high)
21 if (V_ID position is not in Ref_Traj ± ")
22 IM_Data[V_ID].markRogue  true
23 Broadcast-Alert()
24 else if (V_ID not in IM_Data)
25 IM_Data.add(Detect_Data[V_ID])
26 IM_Data[V_ID].markRogue  true
27 Broadcast-Alert()






35 Check-Vehicle-Behavior () {
36 V_Data  Read(RequestQueue.Dequeue())
37 if (A request is received but no vehicle is detected)
38 Change Policy i.e. MAC blocking
39 end




43 if (RequestQueue is not empty)
44 Check-Vehicle-Behavior()
45 [VOA, TOA]  Trajectory-Assignment()








Algorithm 3: Pseudocode for Surveillance System
1 for(every  t seconds)
2 if (new vehicle detected)
3 vehicle = new Vehicle(V_ID, position, timestamp)
4 Vehicles_Present.Add(vehicle, detection accuracy)
5 end
6 if (vehicle leaves)
7 Vehicles_Present.Delete(vehicle)
8 end
9 Update positions in Vehicles_Present[ ]
10 Update vehicles’ detection accuracy
11 Send Vehicles_Present[ ] to IM as Detect_Data[]
12 end
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